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Rights Working Group
Rights Working Group (RWG) formed in the aftermath of September 11th to promote 
and protect the human rights of all people in the United States.  A coalition of more 
than 330 local, state, and national organizations, RWG works collaboratively to  
advocate for the civil liberties and human rights of everyone regardless of race,  
ethnicity, religion, national origin, citizenship, or immigration status.  RWG has  
advocated for the full termination of NSEERS since the program’s inception. 
Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson 
School of Law
The Center for Immigrants’ Rights is an immigration policy clinic at Penn State’s  
Dickinson School of Law.  At the Center, students produce practitioner toolkits, reports, 
and primers of national impact on behalf of client organizations.  Working in teams, 
students build professional relationships with government and nongovernmental  
policymakers, academics, individual clients, and others.  In 2009, the Center produced 
an analysis of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) for the 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), which this current report builds 
on.  
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he has helped promote interfaith dialogue amongst the different communities.  He has 
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Mirwan Harahap, individual affected by NSEERS 
Mirwan Harahap faced religious harassment in his home country of Indonesia and thus 
fled to the United States on a tourist visa in 1997.  He lived in Metuchen, New Jersey 
and worked for a car service company as a dispatcher.  Around 2002, he complied with 
the NSEERS registration requirements.  He was later deported in February 2009 and 
was forced to leave his child and wife behind.  He currently lives in Jakarta, Indonesia. 2 
Denyse Sabagh, Esq., Head of Immigration Practice Group, Duane Morris LLP
Denyse Sabagh serves as a partner at Duane Morris and heads the firm’s Immigration 
Practice Group.  Ms. Sabagh is the former national president and the general counsel of 
the American Immigration Lawyers Association.  In 2010, Human Resource Executive 
magazine named her one of their top 15 immigration lawyers.  She is listed in 
Chambers Global and Chambers USA: America’s Leading Business Lawyers for 2006 
through 2011.  She was also awarded the first Rose Bouzaine Nader Award by the 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee in June 2006 to honor her civic courage, 
organizing skills, and in advancing the just society with its pursuit of happiness, 
creativity, and foresight. 3 
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is the founder and president of the Arab American Institute (AAI), an organization 
focused on political and policy research for the Arab American community.  Since 1986, 
Dr. Zogby has led Arab American efforts through the AAI for political empowerment in 
the United States, such as voter registration, education, and mobilization.  Dr. Zogby 
has been involved in numerous Arab American issues.  In the late 1970s, he 
co-founded and held a position of a chairman of the Palestine Human Rights Campaign 
and later served as the Co-Founder and Executive Director of the American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee. 4 
In addition to the contributors listed above, the authors of the report also interviewed other 
individuals knowledgeable about NSEERS who prefer to remain anonymous.  Some of them have 
been quoted here, while others have only informed the content of the report.
 
3
4exeCuTive summary
 In the wake of the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, the landscape of immigration law 
and policy in the United States changed dramatically as the government scrambled to create 
counterterrorism programs to respond to potential national security threats.  Many of these 
policies relied on discriminatory profiling of individuals from countries with predominantly Muslim 
populations and were based on the false assumption that people of a particular religion or 
nationality have a greater propensity for committing terrorism-related crimes.  One of the most 
prominent of these programs is the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) or 
“special registration” that was initiated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2002 and inherited by 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003.  
 NSEERS served as a tool that allowed the government to systematically target Arabs, Middle 
Easterners, Muslims, and South Asians from designated countries for enhanced scrutiny. The most 
controversial piece of NSEERS required nonimmigrant males who were 16 years of age and older 
from 25 specific countries to register at local immigration offices for fingerprinting, photographs, and 
lengthy, invasive interrogations. Generally, the term “nonimmigrants” refers to individuals who are 
seeking admission to the United States temporarily for purposes of education, employment, pleasure, 
etc.  Other than North Korea, each of the listed countries has predominantly Muslim populations.5   
Many individuals were deported through secret proceedings that took place without due process of 
law.  The specifics of NSEERS reveal it to be a clear example of discriminatory and arbitrary racial 
profiling.  More than 80,000 men underwent call-in registration and thousands were subjected to 
interrogations and detention, wasting taxpayer dollars through this counterproductive response to 
September 11th which has not resulted in a single known terrorism-related conviction. 
 From its inception, NSEERS elicited a strong negative response from Arab, Middle Eastern, 
Muslim, and South Asian communities in the United States.  For a decade, advocacy organizations 
including Rights Working Group, 6  immigration lawyers and the private bar, 7  policy analysts, 8 and 
politicians 9  have spoken out against the discriminatory and ineffective program and called for its full 
termination. 10 
5Impact on Families and Communities 
 To this day, many families are separated geographically because a male family member was 
deported to his country of origin after attempting to comply with NSEERS, even if he did not have any 
relatives or contacts in that country. 11  In April 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
announced that the 25 NSEERS countries would be delisted and nonimmigrants from those countries 
would no longer need to comply with the program.  Although DHS framed this policy shift as having 
“ended” NSEERS, the delisting of the specific countries through the April 2011 Rule did not 
eliminate the program’s underlying infrastructure. Individuals continue to face harsh immigration 
consequences resulting from the program, including deportation and the denial of immigration 
benefits for which they are otherwise eligible.  
Continued Lack of Transparency and Misuse of Data 
 Clear, publicly available information on NSEERS procedures and goals was unavailable from its 
inception and the program continues to lack transparency.  Even today, the agencies involved in the 
program share little data or other information regarding its effectiveness.  The issue of transparency 
is closely related to concerns about the misuse of data.  
 While NSEERS has been suspended, the data collected through the program is still available 
to DHS and potentially other government agencies. It is unclear how the data collected through the 
registration process has been and potentially is still being used.  Much of the data gathered is very 
private and sensitive information, such as that related to individuals’ private financial matters.  Those 
who registered have to live with the constant fear that this data could be used against them in the 
future.  
NSEERS is Easy to Resurrect
 Subsequent to the April 2011 delisting, DHS admitted that the NSEERS program was not 
dismantled because the government wished to keep the regulations intact.  This position is untenable 
as it ignores the numerous calls for full termination from advocates, members of Congress, and DHS’ 
own Office of Inspector General.  Moreover, this lets-keep-it-in-our-back-pocket approach to 
addressing NSEERS suggests that the Obama Administration condones and intends to continue 
policies that rely on discriminatory racial profiling. 
6Failure to Meet Program Objectives
 NSEERS was ineffective and failed as a counterterrorism tool.  There appears to be no 
evidence that NSEERS has led to the identification of anyone suspected of involvement in 
terrorism-related crimes.  In February 2012, DHS’s independent watchdog, the Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG), concluded that the NSEERS database was unreliable and found that the requirements 
of the program proved to be burdensome upon registrants, as they imposed lengthy questioning and 
multiple data checks.  The OIG also characterized the program as an inefficient use of government 
resources which prevented DHS agents from conducting more targeted homeland security 
efforts. 12   DHS has estimated that the program cost American taxpayers more than $10 million 
annually, and the OIG found that leaving the regulatory structure of the program intact provides no 
discernible public benefit.  The OIG recommended fully terminating NSEERS and stated there is “no 
longer a value to the program.” 13 
Postscript
 Following the final draft of this report in April of 2012, DHS released a new memorandum 
about individuals impacted by NSEERS, granting limited relief to individuals who failed to comply with 
NSEERS and who can demonstrate that their noncompliance was not willful.  This memo is binding 
on all DHS personnel and requires each component of DHS to implement guidance within 60 days of 
the memorandum’s issuance and related training.
Conclusion
 NSEERS is an ineffective, discriminatory program which relies on racial profiling.  It continues 
to devastate individuals, their families and communities and its lasting impacts are not sufficiently 
corrected by the Obama Administration’s recent policy shifts.  Rights Working Group hopes that this 
report and its recommendations result in the full termination of the NSEERS program, redress for all 
individuals impacted by the program, and the discontinuation of the use of data collected through it.   
Recommendations
Dismantle the Regulatory Framework of NSEERS:  NSEERS has failed as a counterterrorism 
policy, and national security needs can be addressed more effectively and efficiently through other 
existing programs and/or through programs targeting individuals based on suspect behavior, rather 
than through identity-based criteria such as race, religion, gender, or nationality.  
7Remove Residual NSEERS Penalties:  DHS should, by regulation, remove the residual penalties 
associated with NSEERS and apply such regulations retroactively.  DHS should additionally set aside 
immigration or criminal penalties against individuals who complied with, did not comply with, or are 
otherwise affected by the NSEERS program.  DHS should also exercise prosecutorial discretion 
favorably in cases where an individual has positive equities but faces immigration consequences 
because he or she was targeted by NSEERS. 
Information Collected through NSEERS Should No Longer be Used for Any Purposes: DHS 
should discontinue the use of data collected through NSEERS.   
Increase Oversight and Transparency: NSEERS should be fully audited by DHS through the 
Office of Inspector General as well as by the Government Accountability Office to determine the 
program’s effectiveness and to examine the continuing impact of NSEERS on individuals and the 
potential misuse of data.  DHS should make statistics available on the number of individuals who 
were identified through the program and subsequently convicted of terrorism-related offenses.  DHS 
should also provide complete statistics about the total number of individuals who registered with the 
program, as well as details about the enforcement actions that were taken against them.
Support the End Racial Profiling Act:  To show his commitment to ending racial profiling, 
President Obama should make a clear statement in support of the End Racial Profiling Act (ERPA) 
of 2011.   This bill was introduced in both Houses of Congress in 2011. 14  If ERPA were passed, it 
“would prohibit racial profiling by law enforcement at the local, state, and federal levels on the basis 
of race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, and gender.” 15
 
Fix the DOJ Racial Profiling Guidance:  To effectively combat racial profiling, the 2003 
Department of Justice Guidance on the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies must be 
reformed to cover profiling based on religion and national origin; remove the large loopholes that 
allow for profiling in the name of national security and border security; cover law enforcement 
surveillance activities; apply anywhere federal agents act in partnership with state or local law 
enforcement agents and to any agency that receives federal funds; and make the guidance 
enforceable.
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9inTroduCTion
In the national trauma caused by 9/11, civil liberties came face to face with 
national security. Arab-Americans, American Muslims, and South-Asian 
Americans faced national origin and religious profiling. To take just one 
example, the Special Registration program targeted Arab and Muslim visitors, 
requiring them to promptly register with the INS or face deportation. At the time, 
I called for the program to be terminated because there were serious doubts 
it would help combat terrorism. Terrorism experts have since concluded that 
Special Registration wasted homeland security resources and alienated Arab 
Americans and American Muslims. More than 80,000 people registered, and 
more than 13,000 were placed in deportation proceedings. Even today, many 
innocent Arabs and Muslims face deportation because of Special Registration. 
How many terrorists were identified by Special Registration? None. 16    
--- Senator Dick Durbin (D-Illinois) 
 In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11), the landscape of immigration law and 
policy in the United States changed dramatically as the government scrambled to create 
counterterrorism programs to respond to potential national security threats.  Many of these policies 
relied on discriminatory profiling of individuals from predominantly Arab and Muslim countries based 
on the false assumption that people of a particular gender, race, ethnicity, religion, or nationality have 
a greater propensity for committing terrorism-related crimes. 17   One of the most prominent of these 
programs is the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) or “special registration” 
that was initiated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2002 and later inherited by the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003.  Since its inception, NSEERS elicited a strong negative response 
from Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian (AMEMSA) communities in the United States.  
Advocacy organizations including Rights Working Group, 18 immigration lawyers and the private bar, 19 
policy analysts, 20 and politicians 21 have spoken out against the discriminatory and ineffective 
program. 22   
 On June 5, 2002, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the creation of NSEERS, 23   
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marketing it as a counterterrorism tool. 24   According to DHS, NSEERS was originally designed to 
[R]ecord the arrival, stay, and departure of certain individuals from countries 
chosen based on an analysis of possible national security threats. The NSEERS 
registration required approximately 30 minutes in secondary inspection, per person, 
per arrival; and NSEERS registrants were also required to register upon departure 
at one of the 118 designated ports of departure, limiting travel flexibility. 25 
 NSEERS targeted visitors from predominantly Arab and Muslim countries. 26  The registration 
process required certain individuals 27  to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interrogated about 
their background and biographical information (including details about their families, birthdays and 
birth places, financial information, etc.) at a port of entry/exit or at local immigration office. 28   
Particularly in the beginning, the program’s regulations and guidelines were communicated and 
distributed ineffectively, and at times even inaccurately, making it exceedingly difficult for individuals 
to comply. 29   Although NSEERS has undergone several changes since its inception in 2002, it 
remains a discriminatory program which relies on racial profiling. NSEERS continues to devastate 
individuals, their families, and communities, and its impacts have not been sufficiently corrected 
through the Obama Administration’s policy shifts. 
 This report adopts the definition of racial profiling contained in the End Racial Profiling Act of 
2011 (ERPA), 30  where it is defined as “[t]he practice of a law enforcement agent or agency relying, 
to any degree, on race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, or religion—
(i)  in selecting which individual to subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory activities or
(ii)  in deciding upon the scope and substance of law enforcement activity following the initial 
investigatory activity.” 31
 On April 28, 2011, DHS announced the “end” of NSEERS through a notice in the Federal 
Register (April 2011 Rule). 32   Specifically, the April 2011 Rule stated “that it is no longer necessary 
to subject nationals from these countries to special registration procedures, and this notice deletes 
all currently designated countries from NSEERS compliance.” 33   A press release on the DHS website 
stated: 
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Since NSEERS was created, DHS has implemented several automated systems 
that capture arrival and/or exit information, making the manual entry of this data 
via the NSEERS registration process redundant, inefficient and unnecessary. The 
improved and expanded DHS and Department of State systems capture the same 
information for visitors, regardless of nationality.  As a result of these advances 
and input from community groups and advocacy organizations, we are pleased to 
announce that the Department is officially ending the NSEERS registration process. 
This step will streamline the collection of data for individuals entering or exiting the 
United States, regardless of nationality. 34 
 Although DHS framed this policy shift as having “ended” NSEERS, the delisting of the specific 
countries through the April 2011 Rule did not eliminate the program’s underlying infrastructure, and 
we do not regard this as a true end to the program. 35  This policy shift meant only that from April 
28, 2011 onwards, individuals who would have been targeted previously by the program were no 
longer obligated to register.  Notably, the April 2011 Rule failed to address the ongoing negative 
impacts felt by individuals who had previously registered, failed to register, or improperly registered.  
While a variety of advocacy organizations opposed to the program applauded DHS for the 
“long-overdue” 36  suspension of NSEERS, 37 they also pointed out “that the program is dormant, not 
abolished, and there’s still been no accountability.” 38  Many of these advocacy groups contend that 
DHS, through the April 2011 rule, did not address residual effects of the program, as “there remains 
much damage to rectify from NSEERS’ discriminatory immigration enforcement.” 39
 As a candidate, President Barack Obama’s campaign released a “Blueprint for Change” which 
stated that, if elected, “Obama and Biden will ban racial profiling . . .”. 40  Attorney General Eric 
Holder has also stated that ending racial profiling was a “priority” for the Obama Administration and 
that profiling was “simply not good law enforcement.” 41  DHS maintains that NSEERS did not profile 
based on religion because every eligible male from an NSEERS country was required to 
register regardless of religious affiliation. We maintain that NSEERS did profile based on religion 
because the program disproportionately impacted Muslims. A more detailed discussion of this 
issue appears in the Racial Profiling section of this report.  By keeping the structures of a program 
(NSEERS) that targeted people based on their gender, religion, age, and nationality in place, the 
federal government can be seen as condoning and promoting similar discriminatory policies at the 
state and local level.  A prominent example is that of the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) 
12
surveillance of Muslim communities and individuals.  A series of Pulitzer Prize winning Associated 
Press articles revealed that the NYPD has subjected Muslims to surveillance.  Undercover officers 
infiltrated minority neighborhoods and hundreds of mosques and Muslim student groups, without 
any reliable indication of suspect behavior.  Many of the NYPD operations were built with help from 
the CIA, which is prohibited from domestic spying but which was critical to the transformation 
of the NYPD’s intelligence unit after 9/11. 42  The fact that DHS has kept the NSEERS regulatory 
framework intact belies the Obama Administration’s statements of opposition to racial profiling and 
indicates the Administration’s support of similar practices at the state and local level.
 This report builds on a 2009 white paper prepared by the Center for Immigrants’ Rights at 
Penn State’s Dickinson School of Law on behalf of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee. 43  The purpose of this report is to analyze the impact of NSEERS in its current form 
and make recommendations for meaningful reform.  The groundwork for this analysis is laid out in 
Section 1:  The NSEERS Framework, which describes the legal foundation and the development of 
NSEERS since its inception.  The ensuing policy analysis in Section 2:  Policy Impact:  NSEERS is 
Still in Effect identifies the current issues with the program.  In particular, this section looks at the 
effects NSEERS has on those individuals who continue to be negatively impacted by the program.  
Based on this examination, the Policy Recommendations section provides recommendations for 
government policymakers.  The report also aims to educate individuals, policymakers, and 
advocates about NSEERS.
 The methodology of this report consists of two pillars.  First, it is based on the analysis of 
statutes, regulations, policies, reports, and statistics relating to NSEERS.  Second, the analysis is 
complemented by interviews with policymakers involved in the creation and oversight of NSEERS, 
analysts who have studied the program, and immigration attorneys and advocacy groups who have 
represented impacted individuals. 
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   Pro f i l e
denyse sabagh, 
head of immigRaTioN Law gRoup, duaNe moRRiS LLc
I was involved with NSEERS from the beginning. Right from the start, when they published the first set 
of countries, it was very chaotic.  The regulation was published in the Federal Register.  It was not 
disseminated to the community very effectively.  Many people in the community and those who would 
be affected by the regulation did not know about it.  
I represented many individuals subject to NSEERS since its inception in 2002.  The program was sloppy 
in its original set-up due to the rapid execution, no additional funding for implementation, no additional 
staff and a general lack of clear guidance.  Initially, the regulations of the program were unclear to all 
parties involved (affected immigrants, immigration lawyers, and even government staff) and resulted in 
mistakes and misinformation. For many affected individuals it was difficult to register because of long 
lines in front of registration offices, people being turned away, unclear, contradicting, or missing 
information, and procedural mistakes made by the staff of the government agencies. 
For a lot of people, it affected their lives adversely. I represented a student from Johns Hopkins. He 
was from Pakistan. He had gone in to register. He had applied and had been admitted to Johns 
Hopkins for his Master’s Degree.   Johns Hopkins knew his situation.  However, somewhere along the 
way, Hopkins failed to advise him properly about the timing of filing his application to change status 
from H-1B to a student.  He ended up in jail and in deportation proceedings.  He also was the 
President of the student body.  They and the professors provided tremendous support.  Thirty-plus 
people came to his deportation hearing. The Judge was impressed.  We conducted an all-out campaign 
to get him reinstated.  We were finally able to get him reinstated so that he could stay in the U.S.  The 
fallout from NSEERS for him and many others created unnecessary problems and psychological and 
emotional scars. 
I also observed that as a result of NSEERS, the Muslim communities felt very much under siege.  It 
seemed that the legal standard changed and they were guilty until they were proven innocent.  They 
were placed in a state of constant anxiety and fear.  NSEERS sure looked like racial profiling.  It 
targeted individuals based on nationality, age, gender, and religion.  If the government wanted to 
create an effective counterterrorism tool, it could have developed a list of criteria that would be related 
to the actual focus of identifying terrorists, rather than profiling against whole classes of people based 
on their nationality. 44
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nseers legal framework
NSEERS was badly-conceived, poorly executed, arbitrarily administered, and it had 
disastrous results. 
— James Zogby, President and Founder of the Arab American Institute
 The framework of NSEERS is linked to Section 110 of the U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996, 45  which mandated an automated entry-exit data 
system that would “collect a record of every alien departing the United States and match the records 
of departure with the record of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” 46  According to DHS, the 
initial purpose of the entry-exit data system was to address the extensive problem the United States 
was facing with nonimmigrants 47  overstaying their visas. 48     
 In response to the September 11 attacks, former President George W. Bush signed into law 
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 49 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 
of 2002 (EBSVERA). 50  Under Section 414 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 51  Congress called for the 
integration of the entry and exit data system in Section 110 of the IIRAIRA amongst airports, 
seaports, and land border ports of entry.  The section further emphasized the utilization of biometric 
technology and the development of tamper-resistant documents readable at ports of entry. 52 
 As a means of implementing these changes, Congress placed the responsibility of developing 
an entry and exit registration system on the Department of Justice (DOJ).  NSEERS was created 
under the guidance of Kris W. Kobach, 53 a DOJ advisor at that time.  While NSEERS was showcased 
as a component of the entry and exit system, the program also found its statutory foundation in 
section 263 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 54   Under this section,
The Attorney General is authorized to prescribe special regulations and forms for the 
registration and fingerprinting of (1) alien crewmen, (2) holders of border-crossing 
identification cards, (3) aliens confined in institutions within the US, (4) aliens under order of 
removal, (5) aliens who are or have been on criminal prohibition or criminal parole within the 
United States, and (6) aliens of any other class not lawfully admitted to the US for permanent 
residence. 55 
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 The NSEERS program had three main components.  The first component of NSEERS was 
known as “port-of-entry” registration and consisted of fingerprinting and photographing certain 
nonimmigrants or visitors at all ports of entry, such as border crossings, seaports, and airports.  
Those initially required to register included: visitors from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria, and 
select foreign visitors determined to present an elevated national security risk. 56   Under NSEERS, 
fingerprint scans were to be run on all entering nonimmigrants against a database of thousands of 
known terrorists. 57   All individuals registered under NSEERS were also required to re-register after 
thirty days if initially registered at a port-of-entry and annually if they were remaining in the United 
States longer than one year. 58
 The NSEERS program was expanded to include a “call-in” feature that required certain male 
foreign visitors who were 16 years of age and older from specified countries and already present in 
the United States to register at designated immigration offices.  The registration requirement was 
first applied to nonimmigrant males from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria.  These individuals were 
required to register with INS between November 15, 2002 59 and December 16, 2002.   The second 
group required to register were from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North 
Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Their registration occurred 
between December 2, 2002 and January 10, 2003. 60   The third group included individuals from 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia who were to register between January 13, 2003 and March 21, 2003. 61   
The last group of visitors required to register were from Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, and Kuwait 
and were to register between February 24, 2003 and April 25, 2003. 62  The government’s execution 
of the “call in” registration was sharply criticized.  Requiring males of a certain age from 
predominantly Muslim countries to register constituted profiling based on gender, age, religion, 63  
and nationality. Moreover, inadequate notice and misinformation prevented many individuals who 
would have complied from doing so.  The federal government relied principally on notices in the 
Federal Register to inform the public of registration requirements and, like the majority of the 
American population, most individuals subject to NSEERS were not familiar with the Federal Register 
or the requirements contained therein. 64  
 Finally, the NSEERS program established a system of exit controls, which required 
individuals subject to NSEERS to register each time they departed from the United States. 65  
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Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft believed a critical aspect of the NSEERS program was to arrest 
those individuals who attempted to escape the registration requirements or to stay in the country 
beyond their permitted time. 66
 Failure to comply with NSEERS could result in significant penalties. 67  Any nonimmigrant 
subject to special registration who failed without good cause to be examined by an inspecting officer 
at the time of his departure and to have his departure recorded by the inspecting officer is presumed 
to be inadmissible upon future entry under but not limited to 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) as an “alien who seeks to enter the United States to engage in unlawful 
activity.” 68   If one failed to comply with NSEERS after admission into the United States, he is 
considered to have failed to maintain status under section 237(a)(1)(C)(i) of the INA. 69   However, 
an exception to this rule applies if the individual is able to demonstrate that the failure to register was 
“reasonably excusable or not willful.” 70  A related penalty kicked in for a number of individuals who 
were in the process of applying for an immigration benefit or relief, who were told during this process 
that they must comply with NSEERS through “late” registration.  In these situations, the agency’s 
adjudication of “willful” was often controversial to the extent that officers capriciously stamped the 
passports of late registrants as “willful” even in cases where they were unaware of the program, 
limited in English, and/or of high school age at the time they were required to register. 71
 Another potential consequence for failure to comply with NSEERS is the initiation of criminal 
proceedings.  Pursuant to the statute and related notices issued by the government, anyone required 
to register who “willfully fails or refuses” to do so “shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon 
conviction thereof, be fined not to exceed $1000 or be imprisoned, not more than six months, or 
both.” 72 
 In December 2003, DHS amended NSEERS by suspending the thirty-day and annual 
re-registration requirements, among other changes. 73   In place of the previous requirement, the 
new rule allowed DHS, as a matter of discretion, to notify individual nonimmigrants subject to 
NSEERS to appear for one or more additional continuing registration interviews to determine whether 
the individual was complying with the conditions of his or her visa status and admission. 74  The 2003 
rule left the regulatory framework of NSEERS, related penalties, and entry and exit registration 
requirements intact. 
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 DHS subsequently issued a handful of memos discussing how immigration cases involving 
NSEERS should be handled.  One memorandum issued by former ICE Principal Legal Advisor William 
Howard in October of 2005 addressed the use of prosecutorial discretion and its relation to NSEERS 
(Howard Memo). 75  Prosecutorial discretion is law enforcement’s authority to decide whether or not 
to enforce particular laws against a party. 76  The Howard Memo urges ICE attorneys to use 
prosecutorial discretion before or in lieu of issuing a Notice to Appear (NTA) for immigration action 77 
in certain sympathetic circumstances in which an individual has failed to register with NSEERS. 
Specifically, the Howard Memo states:
When an alien subject to NSEERS registration failed to timely register but is otherwise in 
status and has no criminal record, he should not be placed in proceedings if he has a 
reasonable excuse for his failure.  Reasonably excusable failure to register includes the 
alien’s hospitalization, admission into a nursing home or extended care facility (where 
mobility is severely limited); or where the alien 
is simply unaware of the registration 
requirements. 
78
 Interestingly, the Howard Memo did not 
include “compliance with NSEERS” as a positive 
factor in considering whether to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion favorably.  Reverend Seth 
Kaper-Dale of the Reformed Church, profiled later in 
this report, has criticized the absence of such 
language in the Howard Memo and lamented that 
several Indonesian men in his community complied 
with NSEERS but were nonetheless placed in removal 
proceedings.  After months of advocacy with the local 
ICE office, Kaper-Dale was able to move ICE to grant 
orders of supervision (a form of prosecutorial 
discretion) for about eighty-three Indonesian 
immigrants, nine of whom were incarcerated by ICE but were later 
released as a result of the arrangement. 79
Photo Courtesy of Reverend Seth Kaper-Dale
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 On April 28, 2011, DHS announced the delisting of all 25 specified countries from the 
program. 80   The Department stated that, as a result of improved intelligence programs and better 
methods of tracking immigrant visa overstays, NSEERS is no longer needed to protect national 
security.  In addition, DHS stated that it will “seek to identify individuals and actions that pose specific 
threats, rather than focusing on more general designations of groups of individuals, such as country 
of origin.” 81  This language supports the idea that the profiling of individuals based on gender, age, 
religion, or nationality is wrong and ineffective and that NSEERS represents a failed policy.  This April 
2011 rule thus temporarily suspends the program requirements for nationals and citizens from these 
25 countries.  Key to note, however, is that the regulations that gave rise to the NSEERS program and 
the penalties faced by the vast majority of noncitizens who did not comply or improperly complied 
with the program remained in place.
 On June 17, 2011, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton issued 
two significant memos on the use of prosecutorial discretion in immigration matters. 82  The memo 
called on ICE attorneys and employees to refrain from pursuing noncitizens with close family, 
educational, military, or other ties in the United States, and instead to spend the agency’s limited 
resources on persons who pose a serious threat to public safety or national security.  The Morton 
Memo elucidates 19 factors that ICE should consider in deciding whether prosecutorial discretion 
should be favorably exercised. 83  The Morton memo is the most comprehensive memo on 
prosecutorial discretion since the creation of DHS. Yet, as of this writing, it has, at best, been 
implemented inconsistently. 84  Moreover, the Morton Memo lacks any details about how individuals 
impacted by NSEERS should be treated.  
 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) also issued a memo related to 
prosecutorial discretion on November 7, 2011.  This memo established new guidelines for referring 
cases and issuing Notices to Appear (NTAs) in a manner that promotes the effective use of DOJ and 
DHS resources.  It states that USCIS will refer all cases in which immigration benefits are denied 
based on NSEERS violations to ICE for possible NTA issuance. 85   This memo reveals that 
immigration benefits can still be denied because of NSEERS and that those whose cases were 
previously denied could continue to face negative consequences.  In addition, referring cases to ICE 
for possible NTA issuance means that individuals are still subject to removal from the United States 
because of NSEERS.  This referral policy contradicts the agency’s stated desire to “end” NSEERS. 86  
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 In February 2012, DHS’s independent watchdog, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), 
released a report entitled, “Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security.” 87  In this 
report, the OIG concludes that the NSEERS database was unreliable and finds that the requirements 
of the program proved to be burdensome upon registrants, as they imposed lengthy questioning and 
multiple data checks.  The OIG also characterizes the program as an inefficient use of government 
resources that prevented DHS agents from conducting more targeted homeland security efforts. 88  
DHS has estimated that the program cost American taxpayers more than $10 million annually, and 
the OIG finds that leaving the regulatory structure of the program intact provides no discernible 
public benefit.  Most importantly, the OIG recommends fully terminating NSEERS and states there is 
“no longer a value to the program.” 89 
PoliCy imPaCT: nseers is sTill in effeCT
Of course it could come back because the infrastructure is still there and they [the 
government] still do not get the fact that they screwed it up. They did not get it right and 
they wasted resources and did not accomplish anything. They will do it again and they will 
do it again in exactly the same way because they still do not get it. 90 
— James Zogby, President and Founder of the Arab American Institute
 Despite DHS’ indefinite suspension of NSEERS under the April 2011 Rule, no relief or policy 
has been suggested that addresses foreign nationals and citizens who were placed in removal 
proceedings after complying with NSEERS, those who had never registered because they were afraid 
to register or were unaware of the program, among others. 91  This section also highlights a number 
of policy concerns with NSEERS including the program’s lack of transparency, misuse of the data 
collected through NSEERS, the negative impact of preserving the underlying regulatory structure, 
and the program’s ineffectiveness as a counterterrorism tool. 
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   Pro f i l e
   hadi syed Zaidi, 
   iNdividuaL affecTed by NSeeRS
Hadi Syed Zaidi is a Pakistani citizen who came to the United States at the age of 4.  After being an 
honors student in high school, he attended West Los Angeles Community College with the hope of 
ultimately being able to transfer to a four-year university and enroll in a degree program in industrial 
design or applied mathematics. 92  His parents are both green card holders.  Having registered under 
NSEERS when he was 16, he was taken into custody by ICE in December of 2011, after the 
purported “end” of NSEERS as announced in April of that year.  He was detained because he 
overstayed his visa and consequently faced deportation to Pakistan.  Hadi was eventually released 
and granted a temporary stay of removal in January of 2012. Despite this temporary stay, he can still 
be taken into custody and must check in with immigration officials on a regular basis. 93
   
  raCial Profiling
Racial profiling undermines the rule of law and strikes at the core of our nation’s 
commitment to equal protection for all. 94 
— Senator Dick Durbin (D-Illinois) 
e
 Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has seen an increase in racial profiling practices and policies 
at the federal, state, and local level, particularly the targeting of individuals of Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, 
and South Asian descent or those perceived to be members of those groups. 95  This increase is tied to 
counter-terrorism measures such as NSEERS implemented by the federal government which permitted and 
even encouraged authorities to target these communities. 96  As mentioned previously in this report, the call-in 
portion of NSEERS targeted male visitors of certain ages from 25 specified countries, 24 of which have 
predominantly Muslim populations.  The program was discriminatory, arbitrary and failed to meet its purported 
goals.  Government officials have argued that NSEERS did not constitute profiling in part because it was 
intended to expand to all countries, but this did not occur, as the NSEERS list was never expanded past the 25 
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countries—and individuals continue to be negatively affected by the program despite its suspension. 97  
Preeminent scholar on racial profiling, David Harris from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law stated in a 
2012 congressional hearing on racial profiling that under NSEERS, “Muslims were targeted by using a 
convenient proxy characteristic: national origin.” 98  The agency maintained that NSEERS did not profile based 
on religion because every eligible male from the NSEERS countries was required to register regardless of 
religious affiliation. We disagree.  In addition, while some members of the immigration agency have argued 
that distinctions based on nationality and national origin in immigration are not only legitimate and consistent 
with other immigration designs, the context matters.  In her paper “Business as Usual: Immigration and the 
National Security Exception,” Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia writes:
While profiling based on nationality or national origin may not be inherently wrong, there are at 
least five reasons why it is offensive and in many cases no different from profiling based on race, 
ethnicity or religion: 1) in practice many policies based on nationality disproportionately impact 
particular religions and ethnicities; 2) this disproportionate impact creates the perception that a 
particular policy is premised on anti-Arab or anti-Muslim sentiment; 3) most of the countries 
identified by the government as harboring terrorists have been Arab or Muslim; 4) in practice 
“nationality” based profiling is often conflated with “national origin” profiling; 5) profiling based 
on country of birth has extended to naturalized United States [citizens] from particular countries, 
leading to the presumption that citizens from particular places are somehow less reliable or loyal 
in their allegiances to the United States. 99
The Obama Administration’s refusal to fully terminate NSEERS suggests that the Administration condones, 
supports, and intends to continue policies 
that rely on discriminatory racial profiling, 
such as those of the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) at the local level and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
at the federal level.  With strong paral-
lels to NSEERS, it was reported in 2011 
that the NYPD has a secret squad, known 
as the Demographics Unit, that spies on 
Muslim businesses, mosques, and Muslim 
students on campuses in New York City 
and beyond.  This squad wears 
Photo Courtesy of  Monami Maulik, Desis Rising Up and 
Moving (DRUM)
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plainclothes and goes into Muslim neighborhoods to photograph and monitor mosques and locations where 
Muslims congregate including restaurants, grocery stores, and travel agencies.  The NYPD further monitors 
Muslims who have changed their names to sound more traditionally American.  At mosques, police record 
license plates and take photos and videos of worshippers as they arrive for services.  In 2004, New York City 
adopted a law to prohibit racial profiling, which is defined as “the use of race, color, ethnicity, religion, or 
national origin as the factor for initiating police action.”  Surveillance such as that conducted by the NYPD 
contradicts this law and clearly constitutes racial profiling, as did NSEERS. 100   Policies that rely on 
profiling persist at the national level as well, as evidenced, for example, by the FBI’s mapping program.  Based 
on crude stereotypes and assumptions about which groups commit crimes, the FBI is collecting racial and 
ethnic information and “mapping”  communities around the United States.  Across the country, the FBI is 
gathering reports on the so-called “suspicious activity” of innocent Americans and sharing it across federal, 
state and local government agencies. 101  
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imPaCT on families and CommuniTies
[NSEERS] is a family-breaking policy. 102
— Seth Kaper-Dale, Reverend at the Reformed Church in Highland Park, New Jersey
    Pro f i l e
seTh kaPer-dale,  
ReveReNd aT The RefoRmed chuRch iN highLaNd 
paRk, New JeRSey
My wife and I became co-pastors of the Reformed Church in Highland Park in 
September of 2001.  Our first Sunday was two days before 9/11.  The Reformed Church served as a 
sanctuary for the Indonesian community to worship quietly on Sunday afternoons.  Almost all of 
individuals from this community fled religious persecution in Indonesia and arrived in the United 
States on tourist visas.  However, many had failed to file for asylum.  After the start of the NSEERS 
Program, 103 I urged the Indonesian community to register and many took my advice and did register.  
Melinda Basaran, a New Jersey immigration lawyer who worked with the Indonesians, believes that 
a “good portion” of the community was deported due to compliance with NSEERS. 104 In May 2006 
at 5 a.m., at an apartment complex where many Indonesians lived, armed federal agents rounded 
up 37 men with expired visas and deportation orders— terrifying their wives and children as they, 
along with others, witnessed the men being taken away.  Many believe that this raid was a result of 
the information provided when registering with NSEERS.   NSEERS did nothing more than instill fear 
amongst these individuals, break family unity, and destroy the Indonesian community. 105   
Augus Alex Asa and his wife Grace arrived in the United States on tourist visas from Indonesia.  They 
complied with the NSEERS registration process in fear of being considered terrorist fugitives.  I urged 
the Indonesian community to register, but could have never predicted such detrimental 
consequences.  During the raid in May 2006, Mr. Asa, his wife, and daughter hid in the closet as the 
immigration agents arrived at their door.  For two weeks after, the family slept at the church.  After 
lengthy stays in immigration jails, 37 men from this Indonesian community were deported.  Their 
wives were forced to find work, financially support their families, and raise their children alone. 106   
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On a Sunday night in 2006, I saw a lot of fathers playing with their kids in the sandbox.  In the wee 
hours of Monday morning they were picked up in that raid.  Within thirty days, every single male was 
sent away.  We had people fearing everyday that another raid would happen.  So for the next month, 
we had about forty people sleeping in our church, eating at our kitchens. 107   
 NSEERS has had a wide range of negative social and economic consequences for families of 
targeted individuals.  NSEERS requirements often resulted in immigration detention or deportation, 
tearing families apart.  Many of these families feared not only loss or separation from a loved one, 
but loss of their primary source of income and resulting homelessness.  To this day, many families are 
separated geographically because a male family member was deported to his country of origin after 
attempting to comply with NSEERS, even if he did not have any relatives or contacts in that 
country. 108
     Po f i l e
    mirwan harahaP,  
iNdividuaL affecTed by NSeeRS
I fled harassment and discrimination of Christians like myself in Indonesia in 1997 and arrived in the 
United States on a tourist visa.  I began working at a car service center in Metuchen, New Jersey.  
After the start of NSEERS, I registered under the program and was questioned by DHS regarding 
my overstay in the United States.  In February 2009, I was deported to Indonesia and it destroyed 
my family.  I was forced to leave behind my wife and U.S. born child, and return to a country to live 
without my loved ones.  Complying with the registration procedures and abiding by NSEERS, my life 
has been destroyed, whereas others who did not register under NSEERS continued to live and work 
in the United States.  Despite my valid working permit issued by DHS and my attorney’s demand for 
my release back to my family in Metuchen, ICE has refused to reopen my case.  I constantly question 
why the U.S. government rushes to deport family-oriented men with no criminal records who have 
continued to live in the United States as law-abiding citizens for numerous years. 109
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 NSEERS continues to have real, negative impacts on families and communities.  
Prosecutorial discretion “authorizes immigration officers and attorneys to channel their limited 
enforcement resources towards the most dangerous, while placing sympathetic cases involving 
individuals with favorable qualities like full-time fathers, those with serious medical conditions, 
long-time employees, and students with strong ties to the U.S. on hold.” 110  Prosecutorial discretion 
could thus potentially apply to many individuals who are affected by NSEERS and present other 
positive equities.  
 The October 2005 Memo by former ICE Principal Legal Advisor William Howard and the June 
2011 Memo by ICE Director John Morton 111 advise the use of prosecutorial discretion in ICE 
enforcement, clarifying that the enforcement focus should be on high-priority cases.  However, the 
memos lack clear instructions about when and how to use prosecutorial discretion in NSEERS cases.  
Arguably many of the positive equities that should be considered in the granting of relief, as 
described in the Morton Memo, are demonstrated by several members of the Indonesian community 
in New Jersey in which Reverend Kaper-Dale is so heavily engaged. 112  These individuals, many of 
whom had registered under NSEERS and none of whom have criminal histories, had overstayed their 
visas.  At least 37 were deported.  In 2009 and 2010, most of these Indonesians who had not been 
forced to leave were able to strike a temporary deal with the local ICE office but now face 
deportation.  They had received orders of supervision, allowing them to live and work in the United 
States lawfully as long as they tried 
to obtain legal immigration status.  
In 2011, when the Morton Memo on 
prosecutorial discretion was issued, the 
community assumed that the memo 
would aid their cases.  Instead, ICE 
seems to have stepped up their 
enforcement, requiring 72 Indonesians, 
who had previously been given orders 
of supervision and who should qualify 
for the favorable exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, to report to 
Photo Courtesy of Reverend Seth Kaper-Dale
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the local DHS office for possible immigration action. 113
 Prosecutorial discretion is critical to addressing the residual effects of NSEERS.  The mere 
existence of prosecutorial discretion guidelines, unfortunately, has not guaranteed their appropriate 
implementation. 
There are 19 bullet points [listing factors to consider when exercising prosecutorial discretion] in 
Morton’s June 17th memo…and even if you have 17 on there, and if you don’t have the one or 
two that your field office wants to give, they do not care. Everybody in our community has a large 
number of those bullet points. Fifty-percent of our people have been granted 1 year stays by using 
that criteria and fifty-percent [have] not. That’s how capricious this program is. 114
--- Reverend Seth Kaper-Dale, Reformed Church of Highland Park, New Jersey 
laCk of TransParenCy
 Clear, publicly available information on NSEERS procedures and goals was unavailable from its 
inception 115 and the program continues to lack transparency.  Even today, the agencies involved in 
the program share little data and other information regarding its effectiveness.  The few statistics that 
are available, such as the frequently quoted numbers from a 2003 ICE factsheet on NSEERS, 116   are 
outdated.  This factsheet states that, out of a total of 83,519 individuals who registered with NSEERS, 
13,799 individuals were placed into removal proceedings and 2,870 were detained. 117   The most 
recently available information from the 2012 DHS OIG report states that the number of entry and exit 
registrations decreased from over 250,000 per year in 2002 to approximately 60,000 in 2010.  The 
report further notes that “NSEERS remains a significant part of the CBP caseload” and that “at several 
ports of entry, NSEERS registrants were the largest caseload handled in secondary inspections.” 118
 There are various reports about the lack of information or even misinformation, particularly in 
the beginning of NSEERS implementation.  Voicing the perspectives of many immigration lawyers, 119  
Denyse Sabagh points out that very little information was available about NSEERS in its initial stages.  
Even many immigration lawyers were unaware of the exact nature of the program and requirements 
for compliance. 120  The lack of transparency had grave effects on community leaders and affected 
individuals, as further described by Dr. James Zogby.
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   Pro f i l e
dr. James Zogby,  
pReSideNT aNd fouNdeR of The aRab ameRicaN 
iNSTiTuTe
The Arab immigrant communities we serve at the Arab American Institute have been confronted with 
the effects of NSEERS from the beginning of the program and continue to feel its consequences.  
Right in the beginning, we called the Dallas office of the INS [in charge of NSEERS before the 
creation of DHS] and asked, “Are you sending out notices of information to people?” and they said, 
“Yeah it’s all taken care of.”  We said that we have talked to our people in Dallas, but they have not 
heard anything from you.  INS responded and said “Oh no, that’s not true, we have talked to the 
Arab community.”  INS stated that they had a group of women in, and they had veils on so they knew 
they were Arab.  We then asked them what about the name of the group.  It turned out that it was 
some Pakistani medical association, so obviously the INS officer did not know that Pakistanis are not 
Arabs and that not all Arabs are Muslims and just by [talking to someone] wearing a head scarf does 
not mean that you talked to the Arab community. 
We found much the same in other cities, where they did not know who the Arab groups were, they 
did not know how to reach the groups, and they were counting on us.  It was then that I began using 
the framework that it was badly conceived, poorly executed, arbitrarily administered and it had 
disastrous results.  It was arbitrarily administered, which was what we discovered when they began 
calling the dates because what we found was that if you were from the Clinton era and applied for 
change of status and got married, whatever, changed schools, and got a letter saying okay, if you 
showed up in one office, they said that you didn’t even need to show up and you were fine.  But if 
you showed up in another office you were told that it was not acceptable and you could be held for 
deportation.  We got a number of those.
Now, ten years after NSEERS was created, the lack of transparency is one of the major issues that 
remain.  My policy recommendation would be to request full transparency.  I strongly believe that 
without establishing transparency and accountability, the issues of the program will never be 
addressed appropriately.  That being said, I don’t see any willingness on the part of the government 
to do that.  When I asked a senior officer in DHS during the Bush administration to give us an 
accounting of how many were ordered deported and why, he said that he couldn’t find such records.  
That’s a hell of a way to run a government.  You have people who came and registered at INS offices, 
somebody must have a printout of that, someone must have some documentation of that.  They say 
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that they don’t.  I would like to see how many people went in to register, and how many people were 
deported and why.  Until I see that, this entire process is a mystery and it’s a mystery because it is 
so badly done and that is a huge embarrassment and the government does not want anyone to know 
how badly it was done.
Even if NSEERS would actually be terminated at some point in the future, the issue of transparency 
would have to be addressed.  In fact, the Administration needs to re-examine the effects of the 
program on individuals on a case-by-case basis.  Practically no numbers are known or made available.  
The decision makers responsible for the creation and enforcement of the program need to be held 
accountable, particularly with the program’s infrastructure still being intact.  We need to get to the 
bottom of it.  If the instinct is there and the culture is there, then this will happen again.  NSEERS has 
sowed fear and confusion in the Arab and Muslim communities instead of promoting an atmosphere 
of cooperation with law enforcement authorities. 121
   
   Pro f i l e
seTh kaPer-dale, 
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misuse of daTa
 The issue of transparency is closely related to concerns about data use.  Even after the 
discontinuation of the NSEERS requirements, it is not completely clear how the data collected through 
the registration process has been and potentially still is being used.  The “Operation Frontline” 
program is one example of how data gathered through NSEERS was used for discriminatory law 
enforcement activities that went far beyond the boundaries of NSEERS.  Operation Frontline was 
started in 2004 with the stated purpose of preventing a terrorist attack during the presidential 
elections.  To reach this goal, ICE targeted alleged violators of immigration law who had been 
identified as potential national security concerns.  While the government denied profiling based on 
ethnicity or religion, more than 80 percent of the individuals approached through Operation 
Frontline were from predominantly Muslim countries. 122  Data from NSEERS and two other 
immigration programs, the Student and Exchange Information System (SEVIS) and the United States 
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT), were mined by ICE in order 
to identify individuals to target for Operation Frontline. 123  Advocacy organizations such as the 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee were quick to detect this misuse of the data. 124
 While NSEERS has been suspended, the data collected through the program is still available 
to DHS and potentially other government agencies.  Much of the data gathered is very private and 
includes sensitive information, such that related to individuals’ private financial situations.  Despite 
the government’s claim that the data is being used for NSEERS purposes, those who registered have 
to live with the constant fear that this data could be used against them in the future.  This is all the 
more troubling given the DHS Office of Inspector General’s acknowledgment that “the NSEERS 
database is unreliable and it is difficult for NSEERS registrants to adhere to the registration 
requirements.” 125  The DHS OIG has further confirmed that “[D]ata captured in the NSEERS database 
are transferred automatically to other DHS systems or captured initially in other systems, including 
US-VISIT and Enforcement Case Tracking System (ENFORCE).” 126  
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nseers is easy To resurreCT
 As mentioned previously, what was framed by DHS as the “end” of NSEERS was simply a 
delisting of the 25 countries through the April 2011 Rule.  The legal foundation for the program 
remains.  Subsequent to the April 2011 delisting, DHS itself admitted that the NSEERS program was 
not dismantled because the government wished to keep the regulations intact:
Because the Secretary of Homeland Security’s authority under the NSEERS regulations 
is broader than the manual information flow based on country designation that has now 
ended, the underlying NSEERS regulation will remain in place in the event a special 
registration program is again needed. 127
 The decision by DHS to preserve the underlying NSEERS regulations is inconsistent with their 
sentiment that NSEERS “has become redundant as we have strengthened security across the board, 
while at the same time improving and expanding existing systems to automatically and more 
effectively capture the same information that 
was being manually collected via NSEERS.” 128   
Moreover, preserving the NSEERS framework 
perpetuates the anxiety and fear felt in AMEMSA 
communities.  It also suggests that the federal 
government condones discriminatory profiling 
practices and intends to engage in them again 
in the future.  A significant step towards 
establishing trust and eliminating profiling 
based on religion, nationality, and gender 
would thus be for the U.S. government to 
terminate NSEERS completely.  This would 
require the full dismantling of the underlying 
regulations and the provision of meaningful relief 
for all individuals negatively impacted by the 
program. Photo Courtesy of  Monami Maulik, Desis Rising 
Up and Moving (DRUM)
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failure To meeT Program obJeCTives
 NSEERS was inefficient and failed to meet the purpose the government claimed it served.  
The program was purportedly designed as a counterterrorism tool.  The exact number of 
individuals arrested on the basis of terrorism-related charges through NSEERS has never been made 
publicly available.  In fact, there seems to be no evidence that NSEERS helped convict any individuals 
in connection with any terrorism-related crimes, although the Bush Administration reported that the 
program identified 11 “terrorism suspects.” 129   Government officials have not corrected those who 
have pointed out that “[NSEERS] was ineffective in producing terrorism-related convictions,” 130  or 
that “the NSEERS program did not result in a single terrorism conviction.” 131   Rather than refuting 
these criticisms, DHS responded to a related congressional inquiry by stating that information about 
the program’s success in convicting terrorists is classified and unavailable to the public. 132   
 Another fundamental criticism of NSEERS is that the program is “unnecessary” because the 
data collected through the program is already captured through other means. 133  DHS even adopted 
this view in its recent descriptions of the program, most notably in the April 2011 Rule. 134  Moreover, 
the 2012 report by the DHS OIG clearly stated that CBP itself has pointed to the low value of the 
information collected through the NSEERS interviews. 135  Given these failures and all the program’s 
collateral consequences on families and communities, no argument can be made for DHS to keep the 
program in its back pocket.
I think that it was an ill-advised program and the ultimate goal was not achieved because 
the program was defective from the start… I would abolish NSEERS. There are plenty of 
laws and regulations already in effect. If you are looking to come up with a program that is 
trying to identify terrorists and prospective terrorists, then I would try to come up with a list 
of characteristics that would be related to the actual focus of the search. 136 
--- Denyse Sabagh, Head of Immigration Practice Group, Duane Morris LLP
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PostscriPt
 Following the completion of this report, DHS released a long-awaited memo addressing the 
treatment of individuals who previously failed to comply with NSEERS (April 2012 Memo). 137
 
 The April 2012 Memo offers the agency’s first definition for “willful” noncompliance with 
NSEERS and protects individuals who are able to prove that their noncompliance with NSEERS was 
not willful.  It defines “willful” noncompliance as “that which was deliberate, voluntary, or intentional, 
as distinguished from that which was involuntary, unintentional, or otherwise reasonably excusable.”  
The April 2012 Memo further notes that individuals who are found to have “willfully” failed to register 
can be considered for prosecutorial discretion as appropriate. 
 Importantly, the April 2012 memo is “binding” on all DHS personnel and requires each 
component of DHS to implement guidance within 60 days and implement training in line with the 
contents therein.  Moreover, it retracts from the controversial language contained in the November 
2011 USCIS NTA Memo by ceasing referrals of cases with suspected NSEERS violations from USCIS to 
ICE unless the case is denied for “willful” noncompliance.  
 Despite the significant step DHS has made after years of documentation about the individuals 
and families stained by NSEERS, the limitations of the April 2012 Memo are striking and illustrate the 
importance of the recommendations contained in The NSEERS Effect.  First and foremost, it maintains 
the regulatory framework of the NSEERS program.  Moreover, the April 2012 Memo fails to articulate 
a clear policy for those who complied with NSEERS and now face immigration consequences.  
Additionally, it creates room for ambiguity about what constitutes “willful” by leading with a rather 
broad definition (see above) and later elucidating rather extreme examples (e.g., exceptional circum-
stances beyond the alien’s control, incapacitation of the alien).  Also troubling is the conclusion that 
people who failed to register out of ‘fear’ or ‘inconvenience’ could be found to be in ‘willful’ 
noncompliance. The April 2012 Memo further imposes the burden of proving that noncompliance with 
NSEERS was not ‘willful’ on the individual while at the same time allowing the DHS to continue using 
information that was obtained through or in connection with the NSEERS program.    
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RWG is disappointed by the limited reach of the April 2012 Memo and hopes that this report and its 
recommendations result in the full dismantling of the NSEERS program, redress for all individuals 
impacted by the program, as well as a discontinuation of use of data collected through the  program.  
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PoliCy reCommendaTions
Refugees came to this country seeking safety from violence. They ended up having their families 
ripped apart. Those that did not have their families ripped apart are going through 10 years of im-
migration hell because of NSEERS and the way it played out. You created anger and fear that we 
have never gotten over. It still is doing damage. 138
--- Reverend Seth Kaper-Dale, Reformed Church of Highland Park, New Jersey
• Dismantle the Regulatory Framework of NSEERS:  NSEERS has failed as a  
counterterrorism policy. National security needs can be addressed more effectively and 
efficiently through other existing programs and/or through programs targeting  
individuals based on suspect behavior, not identity-based criteria such as race, religion, 
gender or nationality. 139  
• Remove Residual NSEERS Penalties:  DHS should, by regulation, remove the residual 
penalties associated with NSEERS, and apply such regulations retroactively.  DHS should 
additionally set aside immigration or criminal penalties against individuals who complied 
with, did not comply with, or are otherwise affected by the NSEERS program.  DHS 
should also exercise prosecutorial discretion favorably in cases where an individual has 
positive equities but faces immigration consequences because he or she was targeted 
by NSEERS.  
• Information Collected through NSEERS Should No Longer be Used for Any Purposes: 
DHS should discontinue the use of data collected through NSEERS.  
• Increase Oversight and Transparency: NSEERS should be fully audited by DHS through 
the Office of Inspector General, as well as by the Government Accountability Office, to 
determine the program’s effectiveness and to examine the continuing impact of NSEERS 
on individuals and the potential misuse of data.  DHS should also make statistics  
available on the number of individuals who were identified through the program and 
subsequently convicted of terrorism-related offenses.  DHS also should provide  
complete statistics about the total number of individuals who registered with the  
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program, as well as details about the enforcement actions that were taken against 
them. 
• Support the End Racial Profiling Act:  To show his commitment to ending racial profiling, 
President Obama should make a clear statement in support of the End Racial Profiling 
Act (ERPA) of 2011. 140   This bill was introduced in both Houses of Congress in 2011.  
If ERPA were passed, it “would prohibit racial profiling by law enforcement at the  
local, state and federal levels on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, 
and gender.” 141 
• Fix the DOJ Racial Profiling Guidance:  To effectively combat racial profiling, the 2003 
Department of Justice Guidance on the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement  
Agencies must be reformed to cover profiling based on religion and national origin; 
remove the large loopholes that allow for profiling in the name of national security and 
border security; cover law enforcement surveillance activities; apply anywhere federal 
agents act in partnership with state or local law enforcement agents and to any agency 
that receives federal funds; and make the guidance enforceable.
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GLOSSARY
ADC  American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
AIC American Immigration Council (formerly American Immigration Law Foundation)
AILA  American Immigration Lawyers Association
AMEMSA Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South Asian
CBP  Customs and Border Protection
DHS   Department of Homeland Security
DOJ   Department of Justice
EOIR   Executive Office for Immigration Review  
ICE   Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
IIRAIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
INA   Immigration and Nationality Act
INS  Immigration and Naturalization Service  
NSEERS  National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
NTA  Notice to Appear 
OIG  Officer of Inspector General 
RWG  Rights Working Group
SEVIS  Student and Exchange Information System
USCIS  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
US-VISIT United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program
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